Introduction

Statement of Position (SOP) No. 90-7, Financial Reporting by Entities in Reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Code, governs the financial reporting by firms during and subsequent to Chapter 11 reorganization. According to this statement, entities that were insolvent immediately before emerging from Chapter 11 and, as a part of their reorganization, experienced a significant (greater than 50%) ownership change, must adopt fresh start reporting (FSR) upon emergence from Chapter 11. In general, FSR involves an estimation of the entity's reorganization value, 1 a revaluation of assets to their fair values, an adjustment of liabilities and equity pursuant to the plan of reorganization, and an elimination of the retained deficit.
While SOP 90-7 standardizes and promotes uniformity in the accounting practices of entities in bankruptcy reorganization, concerns have been voiced about the accuracy and the reliability of the fresh start amounts. First, SOP 90-7 offers flexibility in determining fresh start amounts because these amounts are based on forecasts and projections, rather than on arm'slength transactions. This increases the potential for errors in the fresh start estimates. Second, the fresh start amounts may be misstated because management can manipulate these amounts to affect the negotiations on the amounts and the form of the distributions to the various creditors' classes (Jensen-Conklin 1992 and Frideman 1992) . 2 Motivated by these concerns, Lehavy (1998) finds 1 SOP 90-7 defines reorganization value as " [t] he value attributed to the reconstituted entity . . . this value is viewed as the fair value of the entity before considering liabilities and approximates the amount a willing buyer would pay for the assets of the entity immediately after the restructuring." The specific rules of SOP 90-7 are described in Section 3 of this paper. 2 The fresh start amounts affect the bankruptcy negotiations because they are determined while the firm is in Chapter 11 and before the confirmation of the reorganization plan. Furthermore, they are also reported in the proforma financial projections submitted to the bankruptcy court. These same amounts are recorded postemergence as the opening balances of the respective book values (see Lehavy 1998). that the equity value recorded upon the adoption of FSR is, on average, understated (relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from bankruptcy), and that the crosssectional variation in the misstatement in the fresh start equity is related to management's incentive to promote the acceptance of the reorganization plan and to advance the emergence of the firm from Chapter 11. 3 Thus, concerns about management's use of reporting discretion when determining the fresh start amounts seem to be valid.
Given these concerns regarding the accuracy of the fresh start amounts and the evidence documented in Lehavy (1998) on the misstatements in the fresh start equity, another interesting question is whether such misstatements have valuation implications subsequent to the adoption date of FSR. This paper addresses this issue. Specifically, I examine the following question: Do investors continue to unravel the financial statement effects of the initial misstatement in the fresh start equity when setting prices, or do they disregard the effects of the initial misstatement on these numbers? To answer this question, I examine the effects of the initial misstatement (or bias) in the fresh start equity on the association between firms' values and accounting numbers reported after adoption of FSR. In general, if the initial fresh start book value of equity is misstated, both future reported earnings and future reported book values are misstated because of differences in the valuation of depreciable and amortizable assets. 4 Future earnings include the amortization and depreciation charges of the initial bias, and future book values include the unamortized portion of the initial bias. Accordingly, I examine empirically the effects of the amortization process of the initial bias on the association between firms' values and accounting numbers reported after adoption of FSR.
I use an equity valuation model that is based on Ohlson's (1995) model to investigate the effects of the misstatement in the fresh start equity on subsequently reported numbers. Ohlson's (1995) model links stock prices with accounting numbers and thereby provides an empirical framework in which to examine the relation between accounting data and firms' values. Using this model, I derive an explicit relation between stock prices or returns and the misstatement in the fresh start equity value. The model provides a theoretical value for a coefficient associating the misstatement measure with prices or returns under the null hypothesis that investors consistently undo the effects of the misstatement on reported numbers. Under the alternative hypothesis that investors disregard the effects of a misstatement on reported numbers, the coefficient estimate on the misstatement measure is expected to be zero. I estimate this model for eight quarters after the adoption of FSR and test the competing hypotheses by examining the relation between the estimated value and the theoretical value of the misstatement coefficient. The results of the regressions suggest that even two years after the emergence from Chapter 11 and the adoption of FSR, investors unravel the effects of the initial misstatement on book values and earnings reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR. The results also suggest that while investors appear to adjust for these effects of the initial misstatement on reported numbers, the magnitude of the adjustment is constant over time (in contrast to the predicted pattern of this adjustment).
This paper contributes primarily to the literature that examines the question of whether investors account for the effects of alternative (discretionary) accounting choices on firms' financial reports. Similarly, I examine the question of whether investors consistently unravel the financial statement effects of the bias in the fresh start value of equity, or whether they appear to disregard the effects of the initial bias when setting prices. By analyzing the previously unstudied association between firms' values and the choice of the fresh start equity value, I contribute new evidence on investors' abilities to unravel the effects of discretionary accounting choices on reported numbers. In addition, I make explicit predictions about the value of the coefficient relating firms' values to the discretionary choice. As I discuss further in the next section, such predictions differ from many other studies in this area, which instead base their conclusions on the significance of the deviation of such coefficients from zero.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses related research. The accounting principles for fresh start reporting are described in Section 3. Section 4 develops the model used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the sample selection and provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The results of the regression analyses are provided in Section 6. The summary and conclusions are outlined in Section 7.
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This is based on the assumption that the bias in the fresh start equity is translated into a bias in the fresh start value of depreciable assets and therefore is depreciated over a series of future years (see further discussion in Section 4).
Related Literature
This paper is related primarily to research on the valuation implications of discretionary accounting choices. This research typically examines capital market reactions to discretionary accounting choices and attempts to discern whether such reactions are consistent with the view that investors are fixated on reported numbers or with the view that investors appropriately infer the information communicated via the discretionary accounting choice. Probably the most widely studied area in this literature is the valuation implications of discretionary accruals. Studies such as Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) and Wang, Swift, and Lobo (1994) find a negative association between the extent of accruals management and the information content of earnings (consistent with the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis). Other studies find that discretionary accruals have positive valuation implications (consistent with the signaling role of the accrual management hypothesis). For example, Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (1996) and Subramanyam (1996) show that smoothing of earnings via discretionary accruals is associated with higher earnings multiples. Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) and Subramanyam (1996) document a positive and significant relation between discretionary accruals and annual stock return.
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In a similar vein, this paper examines the question of whether investors consistently undo the financial statement effects of the misstatement in the fresh start value of equity, or whether they appear to disregard the effects of the initial misstatement when setting prices. A feature 5 Other areas in this literature examine the valuation implications of discretionary write-offs (e.g., Elliott and Shaw 1988 , Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996 , and Elliot and Hanna 1996 , the valuation distinguishing this study from existing studies in this literature is that to discriminate between the competing hypotheses, I derive an explicit relation between stock prices or returns and the misstatement in the fresh start equity estimate. This relation provides a theoretical value for the coefficient associating the misstatement measure with prices or returns under the null hypothesis that investors undo the effects of the misstatement on reported numbers. This derivation of an explicit relation is not found in most other studies, which instead base their conclusions on the significance of the deviation of such coefficients from zero. (Exceptions include Hand 1990 and Guay, Kothari, and Watts 1996, who derive predicted values for their coefficients.) Absent predictions of the theoretical value of this coefficient, these studies cannot meaningfully distinguish between competing hypotheses. As shown later in this paper, simply assuming that if investors unravel the effects of the misstatement (the null hypothesis), the bias coefficient should be zero would have suggested incorrectly that the null hypothesis should be rejected. In fact, the results of this paper show that the null hypothesis is not rejected when I test the estimated coefficient against its theoretically derived value.
Financial Reporting for Entities Emerging from Chapter 11
The financial reporting for firms in Chapter 11 reorganization is set forth in the AICPA's (1) The reorganization value of the emerging entity is less than the total amount of all postpetition liabilities plus all allowed prepetition liabilities, and (2) The prepetition voting shareholders receive less than 50 percent of the voting shares in the new entity.
The purpose of the first condition, which requires the firm to be insolvent immediately before emerging from Chapter 11, is to prevent the use of FSR by firms that have filed for Chapter 11 for strategic reasons (as opposed to financial reasons). Since any negative equity is eliminated in FSR, this condition also ensures that the negotiations lead to writedowns of debt. The second condition ensures that a change of ownership occurs and that there is a new set of shareholders. When these conditions are met, the entity emerging from reorganization is deemed to be sufficiently distinct (Hand 1990) . 6 Entities emerging from a bankruptcy could have chosen the procedure described in Chapter 7A of ARB 43, Quasi-Reorganization or Corporate Readjustment. According to ARB 43, in certain circumstances, contributed or paid-in capital may be used to restructure a corporation, including the elimination of a deficit in retained earnings (deficit reclassification). Further, entities may elect to perform an accounting quasi-reorganization that includes an elimination of the deficit, and a restatement of the carrying values of assets and liabilities to reflect current values. See Davis and Largay (1995) for a criticism of this practice. from the old entity to conclude that a fresh start basis of accounting is appropriate for the entity's assets and liabilities.
Under FSR, the reorganization value of the emerging entity is allocated to specific assets using the techniques provided for applying the purchase method as discussed in APB 16, Business
Combinations. An intangible asset-"reorganization value in excess of amounts allocable to identifiable assets"-is recognized, and is amortized in conformity with the guidance in APB 17, Intangible Assets. Liabilities existing at the plan confirmation date should be stated at present values of amounts to be paid. Finally, the emerging firm should adopt changes in accounting principles that will be required within the following 12 months. Entities emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and not meeting the criteria for FSR should report the liabilities compromised by the confirmed plan at the present value of amounts to be paid, and any forgiveness of debt should be reported as an extraordinary item. The appendix to this paper provides an illustration of the adoption of FSR.
Development of the Empirical Analysis
The objective of the empirical analysis is to determine the effect of the misstatement in estimates of fresh start book value of equity on the association between stock prices or returns and accounting numbers reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR. To perform this analysis, I
use an equity valuation model based on the theoretical foundation provided in Ohlson (1995 
The unbiased values of book value and earnings (BVE * it and E * it respectively) and the reported ones (BVE it and E it ) are linked by the initial misstatement in the estimate of fresh start equity value. By incorporating the initial misstatement into the econometric specification of equation (1), I will be able to test two competing hypotheses. The first is that investors fully unravel the effects of the initial misstatement on subsequently reported accounting numbers; the alternative hypothesis is that investors ignore the financial statement effects of the initial bias.
Let BIAS i0 denote the initial bias (or misstatement) in management's estimate of the fresh start book value of equity of firm i at the adoption time of FSR (time 0). Further, assume that the bias in the fresh start equity is translated into a bias in the fresh start value of depreciable/amortizable assets and therefore is depreciated over a series of future years.
8 Accordingly, the unbiased book value of equity at the adoption time of FSR equals
Where DA i0 = The reported value of depreciable/amortizable assets recorded at the adoption of FSR (time 0), NDA i0 = The value of nondepreciable assets recorded at the adoption of FSR (time 0), TL i0 = The value of total liabilities recorded at the adoption of FSR (time 0).
Thus, if depreciable assets recorded upon the adoption of FSR are understated, earnings reported after the adoption of FSR will be overstated because of a lower periodic depreciation or amortization charge. Book value of equity (and depreciable assets) reported after the adoption of FSR will be understated by the unamortized portion of the initial bias. If assets are depreciated on a straight-line basis over N years, reported earnings at time t will be overstated by BIAS i0 /N (the periodic depreciation of the bias), and reported book value at time t will be understated by (1-t/N) BIAS i0 (the unamortized portion of BIAS i0 ). Consequently, at any date after the adoption of FSR, reported earnings and book values will be related to the unbiased earnings and book values in the following way:
8 BIAS i0 is unlikely to be related to the fresh start value of liabilities. The reason is that at the fresh start adoption date, the emerging entity's liabilities are recorded at the present value of amounts to be paid as approved by the bankruptcy court and by the various creditors. It is unlikely that these amounts contain any error or bias.
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) 
Rearranging terms,
Where otherwise. zero and for
Equation (6) shows that the bias coefficient δ To operationalize equation (6), I assume that the unbiased book value of equity at the adoption time of FSR equals the market value of equity immediately after the emergence from
Chapter 11 and the adoption of FSR (i.e., BVE i0 * = MVE i0 ). This assumption enables me to substitute BIAS i0 in equation (6) value of equity will be recorded as the difference between the fair value of assets and the fair value of liabilities. In the absence of manipulation, this book value of equity must equal the market value of equity on the adoption date of fresh start reporting. Recall, however, that the evidence reported in Lehavy (1998) (that the fresh start equity is understated on average) suggests that this value has been manipulated by management. Finally, to estimate equation (6), I assume that BIAS i0 is amortized over a period of 20 years (accordingly, N in equation (6) equals 20 years).
This assumption implies that estimating equation (6) is essentially a joint test of this assumption and the coefficient of interest. 10 9 Using the market value of equity immediately after the emergence to measure the unbiased book value of equity implies that I can test only whether investors forget to correct subsequently reported numbers and not whether investors are fixated on reported numbers.
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To examine the reasonableness of this assumption, I calculated an estimate of N as the ratio between the amount of depreciable assets (cost) and annual deprecation (using amounts reported after adoption of FSR). The mean of this ratio was 17 years. Also, about 80% of the firms surveyed in the Accounting Equation (6) tests the effects of both the amortization of the misstatement (equation (3)) and the unamortized portion of the misstatement (equation (4)) on the price of the firm at a specific point in time. To examine whether the period-to-period change in the initial misstatement (i.e., the periodic amortization of the bias) affects changes in firms' values, I derive the return specification. The return specification allows me to test whether investors unravel the effect of the periodic amortization of the misstatement on changes in book values when assessing firms' stock returns.
11 Assuming that the variables' coefficients in equation (6) are temporally constant, the return specification can be derived by taking first differences of equation (6) and deflating by beginning-of-period prices:
Trends and Techniques (1997) use the straight-line depreciation method. Finally, to test the sensitivity of the results to the assumption on N, I repeat the tests using 40 years and get results that are qualitatively the same.
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Using both return and price models is also recommended by Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) , who evaluate the adequacy of these models for accounting research and conclude that the "use of both return and price models has the potential to yield more convincing evidence."
While the derivation of equation (7) results in a model without an intercept, I estimate equation (7) with an intercept based on Kvalseth (1985) , who cautions that no-intercept models should be used only when both empirical data analysis and theoretical justification suggest that they are appropriate. The empirical results show that the estimated intercept is significant for only one quarter, indicating that, in general, the model is not misspecified. Equation (7) indicates that the effect of the initial bias in the return specification is on changes in book values (and not on changes in earnings). Because each earnings report is misstated by the same amount (BIAS i0 /N), changes in earnings are unaffected by the bias.
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Changes in book values are affected by the periodic amortization of the misstatement, which is captured by the term φ equal their respective theoretical values in equations (6) and (7). Under the alternative extreme hypothesis that investors disregard or forget the effects of the misstatement on reported numbers, the coefficient estimates on BIAS i0 will be zero. To test these hypotheses, I estimate equation (6) for eight quarters after the emergence from bankruptcy and the adoption of FSR, and test the alternative restrictions that the coefficient estimate on
2 1 β β and that it is zero. 13 I use the return specification in equation (7) to test the competing hypotheses that the coefficient on BIAS i0 is β 1 /N and that it is zero. In addition to the quarter-by-quarter tests, I
estimate equations (6) and (7) in pooled regression models and test jointly the statistical significance of the alternative restrictions on the coefficients on BIAS i0 .
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
I obtained an initial listing of 295 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 between 1991 and 1994. 14 This listing represented all firms that emerged from Chapter 11 either as public companies or private companies, or were liquidated or merged/acquired upon emergence.
13 Because I use cross-sectional regression analysis to estimate equation (6) (thereby constraining the coefficients to be cross-sectionally constant), I need to assume that BIAS i0 does not vary in the cross-section with the coefficients on BVE it and E it . From this initial listing, 133 firms were excluded because no financial data were available postbankruptcy. These 133 firms most likely emerged as private entities, were liquidated, or were acquired/merged immediately upon emergence.
15 Firms that were liquidated or merged into other reporting entities were not subject to the requirements of FSR because they ceased to exist as independent reporting entities. Therefore, their exclusion has no effect on the size of the sample of fresh start adopters. Firms excluded from the initial listing because they emerged as private entities might have been subject to FSR. For those firms, however, financial information is
unobtainable.
An additional 31 firms were excluded because they did not adopt FSR upon their emergence from Chapter 11. Another 29 firms adopted FSR, but the data needed to determine the fresh start amounts for them are not available; post-bankruptcy stock price information was not available for 27 firms; finally, three firms were dropped because of a second filing for Chapter 11 within the period. These search criteria yielded a final sample of 72 firms that emerged from
Chapter 11 reorganization and applied fresh start reporting in accordance with SOP 90-7. Table 1 summarizes the results of this search.
The two-digit SIC industry classification of the sample is described in Tables 3 and 4 report balance sheet items immediately before and immediately after recording the effect of the plan of reorganization and the adoption of FSR. Table 3 provides the statistics in millions of dollars, whereas Table 4 provides the common size statistics. The results in Table 3 indicate that total assets were not significantly altered as a result of the plan of reorganization and the adoption of FSR. As expected in Chapter 11, the significant change occurred in total liabilities and stockholders' equity, in the form of a decrease in total liabilities and an increase in total stockholders' equity. Specifically, mean total assets decreased by $15.2 million, which was not statistically significant. In contrast, total liabilities decreased by $558 million, or 46%, and stockholders' equity increased by $543 million, or 133%. Within total assets, mean current assets and property plant and equipment decreased by a statistically significant amount (13% and 8% respectively). As a result of the adoption of FSR, a reorganization goodwill was recorded with a mean (median) of $92.7 ($4.6) million.
Similar findings are reported in Table 4 . Total assets decreased, but by an insignificant amount, whereas total liabilities and shareholders' equity decreased significantly. Of the 72 firms, 42 (58%) recorded positive reorganization goodwill and three (4%) recorded negative reorganization goodwill (not reported). This newly recorded asset amounts to a mean (median) of 11% (3%) of total assets. Liabilities subject to compromise had a mean of 110% of total assets immediately before the adoption of FSR (these liabilities are eliminated following the settlement and the compromised amount is recorded in other liability categories). Finally, as noted by those who criticize Chapter 11's allowing firms to emerge with excessive amounts of debt, the median debt-to-assets ratio after the emergence from Chapter 11 is still high, at 0.8. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the variables for eight quarters immediately after the emergence from Chapter 11 and the adoption of FSR. These statistics indicate that during the eight quarters immediately following the adoption of FSR and the emergence from Chapter 11, firms experienced an increase in their stock prices and, in general, positive quarterly returns.
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Median book-to-market was less than 1 for the entire period and declined from 0.84 in the first quarter to 0.64 (a decrease of 24%) in the eighth quarter. The FSR firms in the sample produced positive (median) earnings-per-share for most quarters. However, mean earnings-per-share was negative for most quarters.
Overall, the statistics in Table 5 indicate that the FSR firms in the sample had favorable performance after their emergence from bankruptcy. Their stock price increased over the period, and stock returns and reported (median) earnings-per-share were positive for most quarters.
Regression Results
Panel A of Table 6 presents the quarter-by-quarter results of estimating the price-level regression (equation (6)). 18 The results indicate that the coefficient estimates on BIAS i0 (δ t ) are negative and significantly different from zero in all quarters. Also reported in Panel A of Table 6 are the theoretical values of δ * t , as well as t-statistics for testing the restriction that Outliers identified with Cook's D statistic greater than 2.0 and/or the absolute value of studentized residuals greater than 3.0 were deleted from all regressions performed in this section. Results using White's (1980) consistent estimates of the variance are qualitatively the same as the results with the OLS estimates of the variance. restricted regression in equation (6) 
This specification does not constrain the coefficients on the variables to be temporally constant, since it allows for quarter-specific intercepts and slope coefficients. Therefore, the estimated coefficients in the pooled regression will be identical to their values in the quarterly regressions 19 Specifically, I estimated equation (6) subject to a linear restriction on the parameter δ * t . The values of δ * t reported in this column is computed according to the restriction using the estimated values for β 1 and β 2 . The reported t statistics test the significance of this restriction.
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Notice two interesting observations from Table 6 . First, R 2 declines monotonically as quarters increase after adoption of FSR (suggesting a decline in financial statements' informativeness). This trend is probably due to the fact that FSR involves a one-time adjustment of the historical numbers to their fair values, and firms return to use the historical accounting system after the adoption of FSR. Second, the coefficient on earnings is negative in most quarters (albeit not significant). This finding is probably due to the fact that earnings, on average, are negative for most quarters (see Table 5 ). This evidence is also Table 6 suggest that even two years after the emergence from Chapter 11 and the adoption of FSR, investors correctly account for the effect of the initial misstatement in the fresh start equity on subsequently reported book values and earnings. Table 7 reports the results of estimating the effect of the misstatement in the fresh start equity value on the association between stock returns and accounting data reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR (equation (7)). Panel A, which presents the quarter-by-quarter results, reports that the t-statistics associated with testing the equality between the coefficient estimate on BIAS i0 and zero are insignificant for most quarters. The third-to-last column in Panel A of Table 7 provides the theoretical value of the coefficient on BIAS i0 as well as t-statistics for testing the restriction that this coefficient equals its theoretical value. 21 As shown in this column, the consistent with other studies that have looked at firms with negative earnings (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).
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The theoretical value of the misstatement coefficient and the t-statistics associated with testing the restriction on this coefficient are computed by estimating the restricted regression in equation (9) and assuming N equals 20 years. Results using 40 years are qualitatively the same.
restriction that the empirical estimate of the misstatement coefficient equals its theoretical value is rejected only in the sixth quarter (which is also the only quarter that rejects the equality of the misstatement coefficient and zero).
To examine the overall significance of the results in Panel A of Table 7 , I reestimate the return specification in equation (7) by pooling together all quarterly observations. The pooled return regression is specified as otherwise. 0 and quarter if 1 where
Similar to the pooled regression employed in the price specification, the pooled return specification allows the coefficients on the variables to vary across quarters, implying that the estimated coefficients in the pooled regression will be identical to their values in the quarterly regressions. This specification is used to test the alternative hypotheses that the coefficients on BIAS i0 equal their theoretical values and that these coefficients equal zero.
The results of estimating the pooled return model are presented in Panel B of Table 7 . In contrast to the nonrejections of the equality of the misstatement coefficient and its theoretical value in the quarterly regressions, the joint restriction is rejected at a statistically significant level (F-statistic of 2.727 with a p-value of 0.009). The restriction that the coefficient estimates on BIAS i0 are jointly zero is not rejected (F-statistic of 1.258 with a p-value of 0.270). To examine further whether the results in Table 7 are due to model misspecification, I perform some additional tests in the next section.
Specification Test of the Return Regression
The return specification (equation (7)) is derived by taking first differences of the price specification (equation (6)) and deflating by beginning-of-period prices. This derivation of the return specification assumes that the coefficients in equation (6) (β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 ) are constant over time (i.e., β jt = β jt-1 ). To examine the effect of relaxing this assumption on the results reported in Table 7 , I rederive a return specification from equation (6) that does not restrict β jt = β jt-1 :
where ω 0t =β 0t -β 0t-1 and θ β β β β β
Equation (10) is used to test the effect of relaxing the assumption on the intertemporal stability of the coefficients in equation (6) on the results reported in the return regressions in Table 7 . The quarter-by-quarter results of estimating equation (10) (not reported) indicate that the equality of the coefficient on BIAS i0 and zero is never rejected, and that the restriction that 
The results of estimating equation (11) are similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 7 . In particular, the joint restriction on the bias coefficients that {θ 2 =θ * 2 , θ 3 =θ * 3 …θ 8 =θ * 8 } is rejected at a statistically significant level (p-value of 0.0089), and the joint restriction that {θ 2 =θ 3 =…=θ 8 =0}
is not rejected (F-statistic of 1.159 with a p-value of 0.326).
To summarize the results of the return regressions, the quarterly regression results indicate that neither extreme value of the bias coefficient is rejected. Both the equality of φ t and its theoretical value (conjectured if investors unravel effects of the bias amortization) and the equality of φ t and zero (conjectured if investors ignore effects of the bias amortization) are not rejected.
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The fact that in the quarterly return regressions neither extreme can be rejected suggests that these regressions are lacking in power.
In contrast to the quarterly regressions, the pooled return regression rejects the equality of the estimated value and the theoretical value of the misstatement coefficient (i.e., φ t =β 1t /N) and does not reject the equality of this coefficient and zero. To interpret this result, recall that φ t in equation (7) equals the quarter-to-quarter change of the bias coefficient in the price regression (i.e., δ t -δ t-1 in equation (6)). Therefore, the fact that in the pooled return regression I reject the hypothesis that φ t =β 1t /N but not that φ t =0 essentially indicates that the bias coefficient in the price specification is stable over time (i.e., δ t -δ t-1 =0). Finally, the results of the specification tests of the return regression indicate that my inferences are not sensitive to the assumption of temporal 22 Formally, the quarterly regressions reject the equality of the estimated φ t and its theoretical value in only one quarter. This same quarter is also the only one in which the equality of the estimated value and zero is rejected. stability of the coefficients in equation (6). As I will discuss in the next section, combining the evidence from the pooled return regression with the one from the price-level regressions suggests that while investors appear to adjust for the effect of the initial misstatement on book values and earnings reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR, the magnitude of the adjustment is constant over time.
Summary
This paper examines the effects of a misstatement in the initial estimate of fresh start value of equity on the association between prices or returns and accounting numbers reported after the adoption of fresh start reporting. This issue is analyzed for a sample of firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence. Using a security valuation model that links stock price with accounting variables, I derive an explicit relation between stock prices or returns and a measure of the misstatement in the fresh start value of equity. The model provides a theoretical value for the coefficient associating the misstatement measure with prices or returns under alternative hypotheses that investors (a) consistently undo the effects of the misstatement on subsequently reported numbers, and (b) ignore the effects of the misstatement in setting prices. I estimate this model for eight quarters after the adoption of FSR and test the alternative hypotheses by examining the relation between the estimated coefficient on the misstatement measure and its theoretical value.
Price-level regression results do not reject the equality of the estimated value and the theoretical value of the coefficient on the misstatement term and reject the equality of this coefficient and zero. Thus, the price-level results suggest that in setting prices, investors consistently undo the effects of the misstatement on book values and earnings reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR.
The quarterly stock return regressions reject the equality of the estimated value and the theoretical value of the misstatement coefficient in only one quarter. This quarter is also the only one in which the equality of the estimated value and zero can be rejected. The fact that in the quarterly return regressions neither extreme (zero or the theoretical value) can be rejected suggests that the quarter-by-quarter return tests are lacking in power. Finally, the pooled return regression rejects the joint equality of the estimated value and the theoretical value of the misstatement coefficient and does not reject the equality of this coefficient and zero. Because the misstatement coefficient in the return regression equals the quarter-to-quarter change in the coefficient on the misstatement term in the price regression, the pooled return regression results indicate that the coefficient on the misstatement term in the price specification is stable over time.
Overall, the results of this paper suggest that while investors appear to adjust for the effect of the initial misstatement on book values and earnings reported subsequent to the adoption of FSR, the magnitude of the adjustment is constant over time. In other words, it appears that in setting prices, investors compute the financial statement effects of the misstatement as of the adoption date of FSR, and use this same figure to adjust all subsequently reported book values and earnings. This paper provides several new insights to the literature that examines the valuation implications of discretionary accounting choices. First, by focusing on the previously unstudied association between firms' values and the choice of the fresh start equity value, I provide new evidence on investors' abilities to unravel the effects of discretionary accounting choices on reported numbers. An additional contribution of this paper arises from the fact that I make explicit predictions about the value of the coefficient relating firms' values to the discretionary choice.
Such predictions are not usually made in other studies in this area, which instead base their conclusions on the deviation of such coefficients from zero. Taken together, the evidence that investors appear to unravel the effects of the misstatement in the fresh start equity on reported numbers suggests that reporting fair value measures with errors does not necessarily imply that investors cannot discern and undo the effects of such measurement errors on reported numbers.
To the extent that the association between accounting data and firms' values captures the relevance of such data, my findings counter the claim made by opponents of fair value accounting that if fair values lack reliability (because of errors or intentional manipulations), they will not be relevant to financial statement users. I provide evidence suggesting that investors successfully unravel the bias in the fresh start value of equity. This result could be used by accounting standard-setters when considering the relation between the reliability and the relevance of a prospective fair value accounting rule. =0}=27.87 (p-value=0.0001) 
